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The emphasis on language as a privileged site of
 
political struggle and the resulting celebration of
 power relations as anarchical and dispersed are
 among the most politically dangerous maneuvers
 sanctioned
 
by  some forms of poststructural/postcolo-  
nial theory in cultural studies today.1 Insofar as these
 emphases tend to conflate any kind of “resistance”
 within a structure of power relations as “revolution
­ary,” they participate in undermining the struggles of
 oppressed people. Specifically they allow the val
­orization of any work able to produce  
"
postcolonial”  
credentials as politically progressive without under
­standing the specific history of aesthetic forms and
 ideologies that produced that 
work.
 A relatively  
common example of this type of criticism may be
 observed in an article by Arjuna Srivastava published
 in Ariel in 1989. His argument drives at a formal
 analysis of what is unquestionably a seminal “post
­colonial” novel, Salman Rushdie
'
s Shame. History, he  
1
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 project that puts forward a narrativization of history  
countering the traditional, hegemonic
 view
 of it is “liberating.” That this argu ­
ment is not necessarily opposed to what Rushdie himself would say about his
 work counts for precious little. The analysis defends Rushdie — often enough
 with his own words — against all 
accusations
 that “his work is becoming more  
and more British in idiom and style” (Srivastava 75): it is true that Rushdie is
 writing novels in English, but, Srivastava claims at one point, Saleem 
Sinai
 in  
Midnight's Children “specifically mentions that at 
one
 point he is speaking  
Urdu” (76) and in Shame our notions of “written linearity as a given are chal
­lenged.” Srivastava suggests that “these recurring acts of reader estrangements
 serve a political end: they force the reader to question her own ideological
 assumptions about literature, language and culture, and they are a way of
 redressing the balance.” This is all well and 
good,
 but does it therefore follow  
that Rushdie’s novels are “liberating” in 
any
 real sense?
The problem is that in its ever-growing role as the sanctioned representa
­tive
 
of the “radical left” in the mainstream, poststructuralism  is granting to itself  
the ability to define the Emits of the left
'
s ideological expression. In other  
words, in defining as “revolutionary” ideologies and aesthetics which ultimate
­ly stem from dominant ideologies, poststructuralism participates in the twofold
 task of permitting “safe,” assimilable, subordinate ideologies as pressure valves,
 while simultaneously defusing and/or excluding those ideologies that may
 potentially be able to analyze existing social interactions — locally, nationally
 and globally — in genuinely radical ways. To return to Srivastava, his article
 criticizes the traditional, linear 
view
 of history as “knowing the end result, and  
linking it retrospectively to its beginning” (63); one might, however, say the
 same of his analysis of Shame. Instead of seeking to understand how a text
 works and to comprehend its conditions of production, Srivastava — and much
 of what falls under the rubric of “postcolonial” (and, more generally, poststruc-
 turalist) criticism — essentially creates but another myth in certifying a text
 simply
 
because it deals with the “condition of post-coloniality.”
The analysis of Shame that follows owes much to Aijaz Ahmad’s excellent
 essay on the novel (123-58). Ahmad’s conclusions — as well as his theoretical
 enemies — remain,
 
I think, quite similar to my own in  the final instance. How ­
ever, while Ahmad is more concerned with asking “unauthorized” questions
 about the content of the novel, which force to the surface underlying ideologi
­cal motives in the text, 
my
 analysis will keep to more formal lines, hoping to  
demonstrate
 
that the novel’s formal structure — above and beyond what might  
be thought of as primarily its content — serves to preclude the possibility of
 revolutionary solutions to the problem of Pakistan.
One might suggest that Sara Suleri’s well-known essay on Shame has
 
already shown us a critical perspective on that novel from a formal approach.
 She argues that Shame
must take on as its fictional provenance a series of events so sensational, so
 
violent in its currency as gossip, that the text is impelled to construct elab
­orate defenses against the lure of melodrama by focusing obsessively on its
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own literariness and its status as a formal artifact. Its narrative self-con
­
sciousness suggests a deep embarrassment at the idea of political discourse,
 a nostalgic will to create apolitical pockets in the garments of such lan
­guage. As a consequence Shame turns to narcissism as a ploy of
 
evasion,  
enacting rather than addressing the curious posture of what it means to be
 ashamed. . . . Shames narrative peculiarities become paradigmatic of the
 casualties frequently accrued by contemporary postcolonial
 
writing. These  
mutilations are most readily apprehended through a reading of the strange
­ly shrugging course of Rushdie’s narrative, which implies that because it
 cannot possibly 
do
 justice to its history, it can at least do violence to itself.  
(174)
Her observations are well taken, but her conclusions are not far-reaching
 
enough. To be sure, Shame is seeking to avoid melodrama via its self-conscious
 narrative technique; and certainly this move serves to dehistoricize and to pre
­sent as folklore, ahistorical and uncontextualized, the events surrounding the
 execution of Z. A. Bhutto (Suleri 184). Suleri’s analysis, however, ultimately
 falls short. Rushdie’s "nostalgic will” is not towards the apolitical but rather
 towards the idea of liberal humanism, a well-established ideological underpin
­ning of capitalism and the political entities that have nurtured and proliferated
 it since the time of the French Revolution. Similarly, Suleri’s seeming wish for
 the novel — that it had addressed “the curious posture of what it means to be
 ashamed” — explicitly evades calling for a politically progressive presentation
 of the problem of Pakistan by focusing instead on a desire for a more confes
­sional, more personal narrative. From this perspective, Suleri’s critique appears
 to become a continuation of the politics that Rushdie’s novel offers, continuing
 its turning away
 
from “history” towards the “apolitical” realm of “what it means 
to be human.”
Suleri argues that there exists in Shame a “peculiar complicity between a
 
recognizably radical ideology and a startlingly conservative need to take refuge
 in formalism” [175]. The problem is that there is nothing particularly radical
 about the ideology portrayed in Shame. A 
conservative
 form has by no means  
been imposed on the novel’s ideological content; rather, its conservative content
 has found an appropriately conservative form. Suleri’s formal oversight is, I
 would argue, due to her peculiar understanding of the relationship between
 form and content within the text. Form cannot simply be imagined as the body
 into which the all-powerful author breathes the spirit of content. Nonetheless,
 this model is 
precisely
 the one that Suleri’s critique of  Shame requires: Shame  
could have been made better, she argues, if its “radical ideology,” a critique of
 Pakistani politics, had found a similarly radical mode of expression. A far more
 useful and, I believe, ultimately more progressive paradigm, one that allows us
 better to understand the dialectical relationship between form and content, is
 offered by Terry Eagleton:




which the text is “about.” But this pseudo-real is not to  
be directly correlated with the historically real; it is, rather, an effect or
3
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of the text's  whole  process of signification. What that whole process  
signifies is ideology, which is itself a signification of history. The relations
 in question can 
be






To recast Eagletons argument in the terms of this discussion, one would say
 
that form (signifier) and content (signified) are engaged in an active relation
­ship (signification) that can be described as a process of
 
meaning production.  
The task of the literary critic is therefore to understand the mechanisms
 through which each text produces meaning and the relationship that its pro
­duction has to the ideological configurations at the historical moment of its
 production. As Eagleton argues, “the 'truth’ of the text is not an essence but a
 practice
 
— the practice of its relation to ideology, and in terms of that to histo ­
ry” (98). Discovering the “truth” is therefore not simply a matter of cataloging
 politically questionable elements found in the text or showing how an aspect of
 the form subverts traditional, hegemonic conventions. Rather, the literary crit
­ic must lay bare the way in which the text works as “a ceaseless reciprocal oper
­ation of the text on ideology and ideology on text, a mutual structuring and
 destructuring in which the text constantly overdetermines its own determina
­tions” (99).
At this point, I would like to propose that a useful — though not uncon-
 
troversial — tool for beginning this critical investigation is the Greimassian
 semiotic rectangle.2 What Greimas’s theory
 
permits us to do — which a more  
poststructurally oriented reading cannot — is to identify the extreme limits of
 a text’s imagination, that is, the range of solutions it can offer or dismiss. The
 concept of closure is important here: ideology marks the limits of
 
imagined  
actions and outcomes in a given situation and therefore does not open up pos
­sibilities so much as it closes them off. If, as Fredric Jameson has observed, texts
 attempt “to resolve, in the imaginary, what is socially irreconcilable” (Marxism
 382-3), I would suggest that the semiotic rectangle allows us to map the ideo
­logical geography of the text’s imaginary 
realm.
 In other words, through the  
s miotic rectangle it is possible to unravel what the text “knows” and, logically,
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what it does not “know” in order the better to understand its practice. This
 
“semiotic reduction,” as Jameson has explained, “aims at rewriting a verbal 
or linguistic text into more fundamental mechanisms of meaning” (“Foreword”
 ix). In other words, one is at this point attempting to extract a cognitive ideol
­ogy from its narrativization in the novel
 
— a what-the-text-knows from what-  
it-says. The rectangle, therefore,
constitutes a virtual map of conceptual closure, or better still, of the closure
 
of ideology itself, that is, as a mechanism, which, while seeming to gener
­ate a rich variety
 
of possible concepts and positions, remains in fact, locked  
into some initial aporia or double bind that it cannot transform from the
 inside
 
by its own means. (xv)
To anticipate, this is literally the trap within which Rushdie’s Shame is caught:
 
its existence is, in a sense, its own solution.
What follows is an analysis of the formal structures of Shame
 
in an attempt  
to understand the specific character of the ideologies that appear in that novel.
 The analysis 
will 
begin by producing a semiotic rectangle of the novel as  whole.  
Putting that rectangle aside briefly, I will demonstrate that Shame contains two
 generic forms — the fairy tale and the political satire — and that the antago
­nism and interactions between these two genres in the novel play as significant
 a role as that between any of the characters. Indeed, by revisiting the original
 semiotic rectangle and emphasizing in turn the fairy tale and then the political
5
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that, despite Shames overt  appearance as political  satire, Rushdie  
can only resolve the political issues presented in the novel forcibly through the
 form of
 
the fairy tale and the ahistorical understanding of “man” and history  
which that genre can contain.
2.
Shame is, by its own testimony, apparently about two characters, Sufiya and
 
Omar. As the Narrator observes, “this novel is about Sufiya Zinobia. ... Or
 perhaps . . . Sufiya Zinobia is about this novel” (59); and Omar is, of course,
 “our peripheral hero” (234). Taking a cue from the novel
'
s title, one might say  
that they represent, respectively, “shamefulness” and “shamelessness.” As the
 rectangle is not symmetrical, it is important to insist on its first term being
 occupied by Sufiya/“shamefulness.” From these two contraries (sx & s2), one
 can 
derive
 the rest of the rectangle as shown in diagram 1.
Neutral Contraries:
Raza Hyder (-s2) and Iskander Harappa (-S1)
The neutral contraries (-s2 & -s1 in the rectangle, Raza Hyder and Iskander
 
Harappa, are characterized by a higher degree of ambivalence than the con
­traries on the 
complex
 axis (s1 & s2). Whereas Sufiya and Omar  are, with a  few  
notable exceptions, strong place-markers of “shameless” and “shameful,” Raza
 and Isky are not so clear-cut. Their more ambiguous respective existences in
 the novel
 
can be observed  easily enough, but the Narrator  also goes to some sig ­
nificant lengths to put this topic on the table. Discussing a play about the
 French Revolution, the Narrator observes that with Isky and Raza it is not sim
­ply a black-and-white opposition of
 
Danton versus Robespierre, “the epicure  
against the puritan” (266). Both characters act in roles which must be defined
 negatively. Raza is not “shameful” but rather “not-shameless.” Isky is not
 
shame
less, but merely “not-shameful.” If anything, in Isky’s case, “pride” may  
seem an appropriate term. It is certainly indicative of his attitude throughout
 his imprisonment, and it is finally responsible for his premature death at the
 hands of Colonel Shuja (262).
Haroun Harappa/Militancy:
The Combined Term (Simple Implication) of Deixis 1 (s1 + -s2)
The deixis shared by Sufiya and Raza is one characterized not only by puri-
 
tanism — that is,
 
by a taboo against  pleasure shared by both characters, though  
articulated and circumvented in different ways —
 
but also by extreme violence,  
the psychological-supernatural violence of Sufiya and the state violence initiat
­ed by Raza. It 
may
 at first seem odd that Haroun Harappa occupies a position  
that is the synthesis of the two chief Hyder characters. The key, however, lies
 in the real person whom Haroun is supposed to represent: Prime Minister Z.
 A. Bhutto’s son, Mir Murtaza Bhutto.
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In Shame, Haroun is a ridiculous, minor character. He is, in the Narrator’s
 
opinion, “a buffoon” (285). If he is removed from the novel, the plot suffers
 only minor damage, almost as if he were a later addition. Mir Murtaza Bhut
­
to,
 on the other hand, did something rather significant two years before Shame  
was published: he organized the largest hijacking in history. The London Sun
­day Times painted him as follows:
To his detractors [Mir
 
Murtaza] Bhutto is known as Baby. He is undoubt ­
edly intelligent, but until early 1979, he seemed fonder of parties than pol
­itics. . . . He surrounded himself with American friends, and chased girls.
 He was, in short, a playboy.... [After his father’s execution] he would only
 talk about revenge: “Today, 
we
 launch the long struggle,” he said. (“The  
Vengeance” 17)
When his father was executed, Murtaza suddenly transformed himself from an
 
epicurean student at Oxford into a dedicated, revenge-driven puritan-militant.
 He immediately dropped out of Oxford and traveled to Libya and Syria, set
­tling eventually in Kabul. Modeling it on the Palestinian Liberation Organiza
­tion, he formed the Pakistani Liberation
 
Army. Their first major strike, carried  
out by the militant wing of the group, al-Zulfikar (literally “the sword,” repre
­sented overtly in Shame, as al-Iskander), was the hijacking of Pakistani Interna
­tional Airlines (PIA) Flight 326.




s and al-Zulfikar's approach to the problem of Pakistan as buf ­
foonery. Indeed, Haroun’s efforts are entirely futile, as he is eventually
 
captured  
at the conclusion of the novel’s hijacking episode (287). Rushdie’s antagonism
 to militancy (through the
 
Narrator, of course) should not  come as any great sur ­
prise at this point in the novel. Long before we even meet Haroun, we have
 been exposed to the absurdity of Babar’s participation in what is clearly meant
 to be Baluchistani resistance. This group 
likely
 corresponds in reality to the  
Baluchistan People’s Liberation Front. Rushdie’s depiction of the guerrillas is
 undeniably dismissive, portraying them as a gang of naive fools:
[W]hen [Babar] was in the mountains
 
with the separatist guerrillas, he was  
told the story of the angels and the earthquakes and the subterranean Par
­adise; their belief that the golden angels were on their side gave the guer
­rillas an unshakable certainty of the justice of their cause, and made it easy
 for them to die for it. (140)
The futility and absurdity of their practice is crudely brought home in Rushdie’s
 
discussion of their sexual inclinations:
There were guerrillas who preferred the passivity of sheep; for others the
 
goats’ friskiness was impossible to resist. Many of Babar’s companions
 went so far as to fall in love with four-legged mistresses, and although they
 were all wanted men they would risk their lives in the bazaars of Q. in order
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ribbons and bells for darling nannies who never deigned to express their
 
gratitude. (141-2)
As Timothy Brennan points out, Babar "resists the backwardness of 
his
 com ­
rades who regularly copulate with sheep” by falling in love instead with a pop
­ular singer (138). The difference is enough to elevate Babar above the common
 rebel, but he is finally no more effectual (or admirable) than the rest. The end
 result of Rushdie’s “
analysis
” is laughter — a laughter the precise purpose of  
which is to generate immediate and unmeditated dismissal. Bakhtin has noted
 that laughter familiarizes an object, brings it close, “thus clearing the ground
 
for  
an absolutely free investigation of it” (23). In sharp contrast to Bakhtins
 description, the purpose of laughter in this case aims at a pretense of familiar
­ity, one in which the object of
 
mirth — militancy — can be easily and sum ­
marily dismissed by a sweeping gesture of contempt without a hint of serious
 analysis. Militancy, while appearing as an option, is finally untenable in the
 novel as a solution.
Arjumand Harappa/Political Opportunism:
The Combined Term (Simple Implication) of Deixis 1 (s2 + -s1)
If militancy is, in a sense, putting your money where your mouth is, then polit
­
ical opportunism is putting
 
your mouth where the money is. Rushdie’s carica ­
ture of political opportunism, Arjumand Harappa, is obviously enough based
 upon Benazir Bhutto. On the whole, Rushdie has precious little positive to say
 about
 
the recently ex-Prime Minister, except that  she is  better than Gen ral Zia  
ul-Haq. In 
his
 review of her book, Daughter of Destiny (1989), Rushdie is  
exceedingly condemning of the rosy picture she paints of her father’s govern
­ment:
The resulting omissions from the story are as revealing as the bits she puts
 
in. She manages, for example, to get through her entire account of her
 father’s government
 
without once mentioning the little matter of genocide  
in Baluchistan. She speaks quite correctly of the Zia regime’s torture
 camps, both in Baluchistan and elsewhere . . . but draws a daughterly veil
 over
 
the Bhutto people’s very similar misdeeds. She fails to mention Bhut ­
to’s strenuous efforts at election-rigging in 1977, efforts which, by giving
 him a victory of ludicrously implausible proportions, gave Zia his opening,
 allowing him to take over on the pretext of holding new, non-controversial
 polls. Worst of all, she falsifies Bhutto’s role in the events leading to the
 secession of Bangladesh to a quite scandalous degree. (“Daughter” 57)
Obviously, Benazir Bhutto rode into power when she did due in 
no
 small part  
to her name. Since Z. A. Bhutto’s execution, his tomb has become something
 of a shrine for many. Benazir Bhutto’s need to keep her father’s memory alive
 and untarnished was a primary political necessity. Likewise, Arjumand’s simi
­larly worshipful adoration of her father makes her character the 
synthesis
 of  
8
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shamelessness (Omar) and pride (Isky). Indeed, the novel implies an almost
 
incestuous relationship between Arjumand Harappa/Benazir Bhutto and
 Iskander Harappa/Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. First, Isky’s wife, Rani Harappa, notes
 on occasion: “There are times when [Arjumand] seems more like [Isky
'
s] wife  
than I do” (188). 
Second,
 Benazir Bhuttos real family nickname, Pinkie, is  
used by Rushdie as the name of Isky’s paramour.3
Of course, this all occurred some six years after Shame was written. Dur
­
ing the time of the novels composition, Benazir Bhutto was in and out of jail
 and under house 
arrest.
 Rushdie is not without a measure of respect for her  
position and her 
efforts.
 He declares:
She is a brave woman, has had a hard life and has come a long way as a
 
politician from the inexperienced days when she would issue Zia with ulti
­matums she could not enforce. In Pakistan’s forthcoming elections Benazir
 Bhutto and the People’s Party represent Pakistan’s best hope, and if I had a
 vote in those elections, I would probably cast it in her favour. (“Daughter”
 58)
Nonetheless, as early as Shame, Rushdie is already highly suspicious of Benazir
 
Bhutto’s use of her father to further her own political ambitions. After Arju
­mand and Haroun seize power
 
from the fleeing Raza Hyder,  Arjumand has her  
mother placed under guard for having made the shawls portraying The Shame
­lessness of Iskander Harappa: “People engaged in building new 
myths
 have no  
time for embroidered criticisms” (306). This is particularly interesting in light
 of the political opposition Benazir would eventually face from her brother,
 Murtaza, and her mother. It is entirely likely that she was engaged in a strug
­gle against her mother for control of the PPP almost immediately following
 
her  
father’s execution. Her book, 
Daughter
 of Destiny, makes it very clear — even  
in its title — that she alone is the torchbearer of Z. A. Bhutto’s legacy, and that
 she is regularly put into confrontation with that legacy’s implacable enemy,
 General Zia. Going beyond the simple solipsism generated by the form of an
 autobiography, Benazir Bhutto is not just the protagonist of her book but of
 Pakistan and its future. Sure enough, nothing injudicious is ever said about
 other family members. Even her descriptions of her strong disagreements with
 Murtaza’s belief in violence are articulated as hot-headed political discussions;
 when all is said and done, they are still one big family.4 Still, other family
 members are pushed into the background or are seen as being misguided. As
 her book title suggests, Benazir is the one who has right
 
and history on her  side.  
This fostering and manipulation of the myth of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to further
 her own political ambitions finally leaves Rushdie 
cold
 about Benazir Bhutto’s  
politics at the time of his writing Shame.
One should also note 
an
 interesting detail about both combined terms: they  
represent the two solutions to the political
 
problems of Pakistan enacted by the  
children of Z. A. Bhutto. One is a course of armed violence operating from
 outside Pakistan, while the other is a strategy of Machiavellian manipulation
 from both inside and outside Pakistan. These were certainly 
two
 of the more
9
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s writing. As one might easily surmise, neither of these strategies is, for  
Rushdie, the long-term solution to the problems of Pakistan. Nonetheless, both
 are dismissed not through 
any
 type of political analysis, but rather through —  
of all things an analysis of sexual peculiarities associated with their propo
­nents. Militancy as a solution is dismissed, in the first place, through the humor
 surrounding the bestial practice of the rebels in Q. and, secondly, through the
 
clai
m that Haroun 's activities stem from sexual sublimation following Naveed’s  
rejection of him. Similarly, Benazir
 
Bhutto’s representative, Arjumand, is char ­
acterized as a repressed, man-hating woman — the "virgin Ironpants” — who
 loves her father perhaps a little too much and finally adopts a cold political
 ambition after 
his
 death, using her heretofore despised sexuality as a weapon  
(209) and putting her mother under arrest once Raza is overthrown. Harouns
 sexual indiscriminacy stands directly juxtaposed to Arjumand’s sexual frigidity.
 It is therefore not surprising that these two dismissed solutions join together
 towards the end of the novel to begin
 
"a new  cycle of shamelessness and shame”  
in Pakistan (306).
Bariamma/Family History/Stories:
The Neutral Term (-s1 + -s2)
Bariamma occupies the unique position of being the other storyteller
 
in Shame.  
The Narrator observes:
Bariamma’s mildly droning recital of the catalogue of family horrors had
 
the effect of somehow defusing them, making them safe, embalming them
 in the mummifying fluid of her own incontrovertible respectability. The
 telling of the tales proved the family’s ability to survive them, to retain, in
 spite of everything, its grip on its honour and its unswerving moral code.
 . . . [Her] stories . . . were the glue that held the clan together, binding the
 generations in webs of whispered secrets. Her story altered, at 
first,
 in the  
retellings, but finally it settled down, and after that nobody, neither teller
 nor listener, would tolerate 
any
 deviation from the hallowed, sacred text.  
(79)
As Brennan has observed, the equating of Bariamma’s stories with a "hallowed,
 
sacred text” is far from innocent (128). The Quran was ostensibly the raison
 d'être for Pakistan’s existence and, at the time of Shames writing, the proffered
 legitimation for the Zia government. To claim, then, that the "sacred text” of
 Bariamma’s stories held the "family” together — especially considering
 Ahmad’s recognition that the history of Pakistan is represented as a family
 affair in Shame — is to cast some suspicion on their ultimate beneficence
 (Ahmad 140).
It is not too difficult to imagine Bariamma’s position as a synthesis of Raza
 
Hyder and Isky Harappa. For one, she is the matriarch of the family and
 genealogically the one who binds them together. She is the element that trans
­
10
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forms Shame
'
s imagined history of Pakistan into a  family feud, a rivalry between  
distantly
 
related cousins. Second, her stories are neither shameless nor shame ­
ful: they 
exist
 as they are — at least, after those first few revisions — in order  
to show what the family has been through. In this they are beyond being
 shameless or
 
shameful. The tales exist in the past, and  the existence of the fam ­
ily in the present proves its ability to surmount the past, whether shameless or
 
shame
ful. As the neutral term, however, Bariamma and her tales, as well as the  
connections to the past and the sense of family and community
 
the tales repre ­
sent, are precisely that term in the equation structurally excluded from being
 the solution to the novel.
The Narrator/Shame/The Postmodern Tale:
The Complex or Ideal Term (s1 + s2)
Looking at the neutral axis and its synthesis, one discovers that the three terms
 
form a big, happy family — quite literally. 
Likewise,
 in a sense, the complex  
axis and its synthesis form another family
 
of sorts. Sufiya, Omar and the Nar ­
rator are the only three main characters conceived outside of the known per
­sonalities of Pakistani politics. Not surprisingly, Sufiya and Omar are the two
 characters who engage the majority of the Narrators more self-reflexive
 moments and are most often in the spotlight of 
his
 thoughts and analyses  
throughout the course of the novel. The three of them are the last characters
 left onstage in the final pages of the book, and it is out of the ruins of the final
 apocalyptic meeting of
 
Sufiya and Omar that the Narrator rises to present his  
tale. In essence, then, the Narrator and his "postmodern” novel are born of the  
cataclysmic union of shamefulness and shamelessness.
The issue ahead of us is twofold: what is the specific nature of this "post
­
modern” narration and why are Bariamma’s stories so opposed to it? These are
 finally, strictly speaking, formal questions; in order to answer them, it is neces
­sary to dissect Shame into what seem to be two of its major constituent genres:
 the fairy tale and the political satire.
3.
We will start this process 
by
 taking Rushdie — or more precisely, the Narrator  
— at 
his
 word when he says that Shame is a  "modern fairy  tale” (72).5 Viewing  
the novel from this partial perspective allows us to separate it formally into dif
­ferent but interacting parts. Following Vladimir Propp’s
 
well-known schema in 
Morphology of the Folktale, we find that Shame does indeed show the structure
 of a
 
"fairy  tale”  — but only  some of the time. The breakdown of the novel  into  
Propp’s morphological categories brings to light a fairy tale with two ""moves,”
 as Propp calls them: Raza’s murder of Omar’s
 
brother, Babar, and Omar’s desire  
for Raza’s daughter, Sufiya. These 
two
 moves come together in Omar’s mar ­
riage to Sufiya — and the betrayal of family that his 
choice
 entails — and are  
resolved through the deaths of both 
villain
 and hero at the end. At this point,
11
Finn: Failings of Form in Salman Rushdie's Shame
Published by eGrove, 2020
46 Journal x
a number of observations about the “fairy tale” extracted from Shame appear.6
 
First and foremost, only half the novel
 
— quite literally — belongs to the fairy 
tale portion of the narrative. If one were to be totally schematic about it,
 approximately 150 pages of
 
Shame (including all of chapters 4, 5 and 9) con ­
tribute nothing to the novels progression through the functional elements of
 the “fairy tale” as delineated above. These pages are located primarily in the
 first three-quarters of the novel, whereas the last quarter of the novel remains
 dominated by the “
fairy
 tale.”7
Second, the Harappas 
play
 no part whatsoever in the fairy tale portion of  
Shame. As half the text is outside the “fairy tale,” it should come as no great
 surprise that half the dramatis personae are likewise absent. Arguably, Iskan
­der Harappa does appear functionally as a “home” from which the hero, Omar,
 is forced (a classic fairy tale device [see Propp 39]), but the overall importance
 of this role is marginal and its absence from the scheme of the fairy tale (or its
 being 
assigned
 to another character) would affect the tale little, if at all.
With the Harappas out of the way, one discovers that Shames “fairy
 
tale” is  
really only about the Shakil-Hyder families with — and this is the third point
 — the character of Raza Hyder generally acting in Propp’s functional role of the
 villain. Propp explains that the villain’s “role is to disturb the peace of a happy
 family, to cause some form of misfortune, damage, or harm” (27). Raza, espe
­cially in the murder of Babar, which will produce the
 
Three Sisters’ motive for  
revenge, enacts most of the specific functions attributed 
by
 Propp to the villain  
of a fairy tale.8 While it is not his first appearance in the novel as a whole,
 Raza’s entry into the town of Q. (along with 
his
 subsequent interaction with  
Babar) 
marks
 his entrance into the fairy tale aspect of Shame.
Raza’s occupation of this structural position may not
 
seem immediately sur ­
prising considering that the “inspiration” for 
Raza,
 General Zia, was generally  
viewed as a
 
villain in the British press and among Pakistani cosmopolitans liv ­
ing in Britain at the time.9 This
 
was especially true after the execution of Bhut ­
to. Nonetheless, Rushdie is, after the fashion of his general pessimism, out to
 condemn anyone and everyone. The events that follow Raza’s entry into Q. fall
 so neatly into Propp’s functional elements, that, in a sense, the pathology of the
 
fairy
 tale cannot afford Rushdie the luxury of such an encompassing sardonic  
stance.10 It is almost as if Rushdie had Propp’s Morphology opened in front of
 him as he wrote. Raza’s strong ties to the functional role of the villain of
 Rushdie’s “fairy tale” will eventually have a significant impact on this analysis.
Fourth, as told through the form of the “fairy
 
tale,” Sufiya’s transformation  
into the Beast occurs strictly through sexual anxiety. Like Rushdie’s dismissal
 of Haroun and Arjumand because of their sexual hang-ups, the “fairy tale”
 reduces to a
 
psychosexual issue the “shame” that brings the Beast out of Sufiya.  
Sufiya is a girl in a woman’s body, unable to control her drives, prevented from
 fulfilling them, and incapable, finally, of even recognizing them:
There is a thing that women do at night with husbands. She does not do
 
it, Shahbanou does it for her. I hate fish. Her husband does not come to
 her at night. . . . But she is a wife. She has a husband. She can’t work this
 out. The horrible thing and the horrible not-doing-the-thing.... There is
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an
 ocean. She feels its tide. And, somewhere in its depths, a Beast, stir ­
ring. (237)
The sexual relationship between Shahbanou and Omar and the eventual preg
­
nancy of the former are the catalyst for
 
bringing the Beast  in Sufiya to the sur ­
face.
Sufiya Zinobia stiff as a board in bed. Trying to bring the good things out
 
of her head, babies, her father’s smile. But instead there is only the thing
 inside Shahbanou, the thing that husbands make, because he did not give
 me the baby she took it inside her instead. She, Sufiya, possessed by fault
 and 
shame.
 That woman who loved me. And my  husband, who can blame  
him, he never had a wife. Overandover [sic] in her empty room; she is a
 tide rising towards flood, she feels something coming, roaring, feels it take
 her, the thing, the flood or perhaps the thing in the flood, the Beast burst
­ing forth to wreak its havoc on the world, and after that she knows noth
­ing, 
will
 remember nothing, because it, the thing, is free. (241-2)
Sufiya
 
is a  classic case of sexual repression producing powerful hysteria. Absent  
in the "fairy tale” are any non-sexual reasons for the transformation. Indeed,
 what we have is a tale of a hero seeking to break through his love’s repressed
 sexuality. Initially terrified of its power when it is finally released as the Beast,
 our hero willingly 
succumbs
 to its passion in a deadly embrace:
[Omar] stood
 
beside the bed and waited for her [Sufiya/Beast] like a bride ­
groom on his wedding night. . . . He struggled against [her eyes’] hypnotic
 power, their gravitational pull,
 
but it was no use, his eyes lifted, until  he was  
staring into the fiery yellow heart of her, and saw there, just for an instant,
 some flickering, some dimming of the 
flame
 in doubt, as though she had  
entertained for that tiny fragment of time the wild fantasy that 
she
 was  
indeed a bride entering the chamber of her beloved; but the furnace burned
 the doubts away, and as he stood before her unable to move, her hands, his
 wife’s hands, reached out to him and closed.
His body was falling away
 
from her, a headless trunk, and after that  the  
Beast faded in her once again, she stood there blinking stupidly, unsteady
 on her feet, as if she didn’t know that all the stories had to end together,
 that the fire was just gathering its strength, that
 
on the day of reckoning the  
judges are not exempt from judgment, and that the power of the Beast of
 shame cannot be held for long within any one frame of 
flesh
 and blood,  
because it grows, it feeds and swells, until the vessel bursts. (317)
The language is blatantly erotic; the sex-death correspondence is plain, and the
 
expenditure of sexual force experienced by the Beast in Omar’s decapitation is
 all too obvious. What isn’t completely evident is that Omar must desire his
 death, at least according to Omar’s own discourse on the nature of hypnosis:
 "Impossible to persuade a subject to do anything she [or he] is unwilling to do”
 (138). The question we should ask is: if 
marriages
 and sexual consummations  
13
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by their very  nature, productive, what is finally produced  in the cataclysm of  
the final scene? Or better still, what is finally
 
reproduced? As I have said above,  
the Narrator is the only one left standing in the last paragraph. Who is he?
 And
 




the novel after the fairy tale portion of Shame is extracted  
amounts more or less to the narrative of the political situation in Peccavistan:
 the rebellion in Q., the Independence of the Eastern Province, the 
rise
 of  
Iskander and his party, Iskander’s overthrow, and the ascendancy of Raza and
 his Islamic Republic. As is obvious — and as others have discussed quite ade
­quately elsewhere correspondences between events in Peccavistan and real
 
events
 in Pakistan pervade the novel. As Brennan has succinctly phrased it,  
“Shame covers a central episode in Pakistan’s internal
 
fife, which it  portrays as a  
family squabble between Iskander Harappa (Zulfikar Afi Bhutto) and his suc
­cessor and executioner Raza Hyder (Zia ul-Haq)” (119).11
Indeed, this is the specificity of the political parody offered in Shame-, the
 
reduction of political struggle in Pakistan to an internal family antagonism.
 Ahmad observes critically:
The problem is that the 
experience
 of a certain class  — rather, a  ruling  elite  
— is presented, in the rhetorical stance of the book, as the 
experience
 of a  
“country.” Far from being about “the East” or even about “Pakistan,” the
 book is actually about a rather narrow social stratum — so narrow, in fact,
 that Rushdie himself is able to portray all the major characters as belong
­ing to a single family. (140)
Ahmad’s criticism on this point is obviously very well founded, even if
 
Rushdie’s reduction of this political struggle to a family quarrel is not com
­pletely invented.12 Nonetheless, briefly, for
 
the  purpose of this argument,  let  us  
accept
 
this authorial strategy  uncritically as an allegory, but with a twist. Frank  
Palmeri writes:
As
 a mode of praise, allegory raises its subject  from a  lower  rank to a high ­
er 
one;
 as a  figure, it implies systematic,  hierarchical, authoritarian, and cos ­
mic order. When parody dissolves allegory, irony results. (14)
In the case of Shame, 
allegory
 is able to elevate the topic of an elite family to  
that of the nation as a whole, but with the dissolution brought on by parody,
 irony remains. Additionally, these two modes — allegory and irony — work
 perfectly into Rushdie’s play on the novel’s “fifteenth-century” setting. Palmeri
 again observes:
Whereas allegory served as the preeminent form of expression in the Mid
­
dle Ages, irony has served as the predominant form of literary expression
 for the last three centuries.
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Strangely enough, Shames fifteenth-century setting can be either “medieval”
 
times (forgetting the Hegirian calendar and invoking
 
allegory) or  modern times  
(by recalling the Islamic reckoning and thereby emphasizing irony). One can
 therefore see the combination of allegory (far from a “mode of praise” here) and
 parody in Shame as a means, at one and the same time, of reducing political
 struggle to family conflict
 
and  of utilizing  that hierarchical reduction to ridicule  
the real.
According to Palmeri, narrative satire — for we can call the other genre 
in 
Shame political satire — is characterized by the following features: 1) the
 reduction of nobility to commonality;
 2)
 following Bakhtin, “an unresolved dia ­
logue
 
between opposed and  parodied philosophical alternatives ... [describing]  
a dialectic without a synthesis”; 3) the ability to subsume other genres; 4) the
 presence of reversals but the absence of recognitions; and
 
5) as opposed  to poet ­
ical satire, a more subversive and progressive world view due to its higher
 potential degree of overdetermination (1-17). Excluding the first of these,
 which is not only obvious in some of the cruder moments of Shame but has
 already been suggested in the reduction of political struggle to family conflict,
 
we
 will now proceed through these points in an effort to tease out the specific  
nature of the political-satiric genre in Shame and its ramifications overall.
In keeping with the second characteristic of satire, this genre in Shame is
 
incapable of producing a solution to the problems it poses. Palmeri writes:
[N]arrative satires aim not to arrive at a truth that can be neatly formulat
­
ed, but rather to use the process of parodic inversion in order to investigate
 philosophical attitudes toward the world; to this end, they invert both the
 officially accepted orthodoxy and its antagonistic inverted opposite. This
 parodic dialogicality produces satires distinctive open-endedness, which
 resists both comic and tragic forms of resolution and closure. The marriage
 that closes comedies emblematically signifies reconciliation between
 opposing social groups and philosophies, but satire excludes compromises
 and middle grounds as it portrays extreme positions and their opposites.
 Narrative satires do not end with an 
achieved
 harmony; the struggle they  
embody between opposed views of the world reaches no satisfactory reso
­lution or synthesis. (4)
The political-satiric portion of the novel represents Pakistani politics as an
 
antagonism between two opposed alternatives — the “Socialist/Western
 reformism of Harappa versus the Islamic militarism of Raza Hyder,
 
both disin ­
genuous, corrupt and repressive.13 This antagonism is schematically represent
­ed in diagram 2 (see below, page 50). The ideological terms occupied
 
by Iskan ­
der Harappa and Raza Hyder are finally unsynthesizable in the text, or rather,
 to anticipate the course of my argument, they are unsynthesizable within the
 political-satiric portion of the novel. It is not a simple matter of putting the
 black hat on Raza/Zia and placing him in the position of scapegoat for the
 troubles of Pakistan. The issues run deeper
 
than this and reveal a more overde ­
termined structure in play. The Narrator is therefore correct to observe:
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Iskander Harappa was not just Danton; Raza Hyder wasn’t Robespierre
 
pure-and-simple. Isky certainly lived it
 
up, perhaps he was something  of an 
epicure, but he also believed that he was always, unarguably, right. . . . And
 Raza Hyder? Is it possible to believe that he took no pleasure in what he
 did, that the pleasure principle was not in operation, even though he
 claimed to act in the name of God? I don’t think so.
Isky and Raza. They, too, were Danpierre and Robeston. Which 
may 
be an explanation; but it cannot, of course, 
be
 an excuse. (267)
Or for that matter, a solution. For further understanding of this problem, 
one 
must turn to the third "capability” of political satire: its ability to subsume other
Diagram 2. Semiotic Rectangle of Political-Satiric Portion of Shame
Narrative satire, as Palmeri points out, is the literary form most capable of
 
incorporating other genres within its structure. This is, of course, not unique
 to the satiric novel. Bakhtin writes that the novel
permits the incorporation of various genres, both artistic (inserted short
 
stories, lyrical songs, poems,
 
dramatic scenes, etc.) and extra-artistic (every ­
day, rhetorical, scholarly, religious genres and others). In principle, any
 genre could be included in the construction of the novel. . . . Such incor
­porated genres usually preserve within the novel their own structural
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integrity and independence, as well as their own linguistic and stylistic
 
peculiarities. (320-21)
Nonetheless, Palmeri argues that the extremely dialogic nature of narrative
 
satire makes it unusually welcoming to opposing narrative styles in order “to
 suggest the conventionality and limitation of any single form of reference. In
 this way, narrative satire establishes a dialogue among forms” (5). Thus, it
 would appear
 
that Shame, as narrative satire, is able to incorporate the fairy-tale  
form within itself — or at least this configuration is required by and for the
 standard reading of the novel.
Such
 a reading is precisely what has made Shame, in Ahmad 's words, a  
“classic of [the] counter-canon,” though the novel
'
s ostensible purpose is like ­
wise what made this reading possible in the first place. The “postcolonial” or
 “Third World” novel seeks “to give appropriate form (preferably allegory, but
 epic also, or fairy 
tale,
 or whatever) to the national  experience” (Ahmad 125,  
124). As Ahmad argues, this developing counter-canon of “postcolonial” writ
­ing arbitrates inclusion and exclusion of texts based upon the level of overt
 commentary on the nature of being colonized and grappling with its afteref
­fects. Likewise, the overwhelming impulse among literary
 
critics when reading  
a text such as Shame is to analyze it primarily from this perspective. Doing so
 forces one to read Shame
 
first and foremost as political satire (that is, as a  polit ­
ical 
allegory
 with  parody). To do this, however, one must  understand the fairy ­
tale element as a device in the service of the more important, all-encompassing
 political satire, disregarding what the Narrator makes perfectly clear: Shame is
 “a modern fairy tale” (72).
As it turns out, the Narrator is only too correct: Shame is first and last —
 
quite literally — a fairy tale. If one views the fairy tale as being only the
 “peripheral” tale — in the 
same
 way that Omar is the “peripheral hero” in the  
novel — then one misses the inevitable formal failings of the political-satiric
 genre for Rushdie. In other words, Shames political satire cannot really contain
 the fairy-tale portion of the novel. We find
 
instead that the genres remain quite  
distinct from one another, each occupying, conveniently enough, just about half
 the novel. On the one hand we have the political-satiric portion of the novel
 (the political struggle between Isky and Raza); on the other we have the fairy
 tale (the tale of love and 
revenge
 between the Shakils and the Hyders); and  
between them (or better still, above them), mediating them, turning
 
the one off  
and the other on, 
we
 find the Narrator and a textbook example of “postmodern”  
self-reflexive narration. Further still, both on a purely obvious and on a struc
­tural level,
 
we can see that the fairy-tale portion both begins the novel and ends  
it. This latter point is important: the Narrator cannot resolve the dilemmas
 broached by the novels political-satiric portion within that genre; the novel
 must instead escape into the form of
 
the fairy tale in order to produce, or at  
least to pursue, a solution. Quite literally then, in an attempt to escape from
 the
 
insolubility of narrative satire, the Narrator himself kicks Raza out  of power  
and installs Arjumand and Haroun in a manner that he self-mockingly admits
 is slipshod:
17
Finn: Failings of Form in Salman Rushdie's Shame
Published by eGrove, 2020
52 Journal x
Well, well, I musn't
 
forget I m only telling  a fairy-story. My dictator will be 
toppled by goblinish, faery [sic] means. "Makes it pretty easy for you,” is
 the obvious criticism; and I agree, I agree. But add, even if it does sound a
 bit peevish: “You try and get rid of a dictator some time.” (284)
Thus concludes Shame's political satire: the fairy tale, in the person of Sufiya
 
Zinobia/Beast, spirals in towards the center to chase the political satire out of
 the novel for good. The last twenty or so pages are spent in the mode of the
 fairy-tale genre attempting to resolve the ideological antagonisms produced
 over the course of the novel as whole.
The structural implications of this formal retreat can be clearly demon
­
strated by making a revision to an abridged form of the original semiotic rec
­tangle (diagram 1). The changes are shown in diagram 3. First, unlike the rec-
Diagram 3. Revisions to the Original Semiotic Rectangle of Shame
tangle drawn specifically from the political-satiric genre (diagram 
2),
 the over ­
all rectangle for the whole novel has access to the importance of the Narrator
 and his narrative self-awareness. This larger perspective permits a synthesis of
 Isky and Raza to be found in the form of Bariamma and the stories that hold
 the family together and in power. Whereas no synthesis between these terms
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was possible within the confines of the genre of political satire, one is possible
 
in the overall narrative; but it is a synthesis that can never be a solution. The
 solution to Shame is not found in the genre of political 
satire
 or — apparently  
contradicting the demands of “counter-canonicity” — in the questions of the
 Pakistani nation that
 
it satirizes. The solution is instead found outside both in  
the form of the 
fairy
 tale and in the state of migrancy.14
Moreover, there is actually a fluctuation in the third term of Shame
'
s over ­
all semiotic rectangle, depending upon whether one emphasizes the fairy-tale
 portion of the narrative or the political satire portion (see diagram 4). When
Diagram 4. Comparison of Neutral Axes and Terms
the emphasis is placed on the fairy-tale genre in the overall narrative, the Three
 
Sisters seem to represent the -s1 position of “not-shameful”/"pride” (alongside
 Isky, to the small extent that he 
appears
 in this portion of the novel). What do  
Raza and
 
the Three Sisters have in common? In the most mundane, yet impor ­
tant, sense, they both represent homes in which Omar lives at various points 
in his life. The opposite of “home” in Shame is a state of migrancy; and the fact
 of this antinomy places further weight upon the sense of “home.” In the larg
­er sense suggested by the use of migrancy in the novel, one might interpret
 “home” more generally as the nation-home. On the other hand, emphasizing
 the political-satiric portion of the narrative brings out the formal antagonism
 in the piece: the neutral axis, political satire (Raza versus Isky), opposes the
 complex axis, fairy tale (Sufiya versus Omar). Their combination, as seen in
 diagram 4, yields the general antagonism in the novel between the political
 satire of the nation (the neutral axis) and the fairy tale of migrancy (the com
­plex axis).




than General Zias counterpart, Raza Hyder. As Jameson has observed of  
Greimas’s semiotic rectangle, the fourth term is the most critical; it is the nega
­tion of the negation (“Foreword” xvii). It is Raza, then, who unites the two
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genres at their own levels, moving in and out and between them, and playing
 
the role of the villain in both: the killer of Babar and the executioner —
 intended, at least of Isky. Likewise, in the real world, the existence of the
 novel Shame is predicated upon the actions of General Zia. Regardless of
 Rushdie’s claims to a
 
more  universal indictment of politics in Pakistan, “Zia” —  
that is, the ideological place-marker for the individual named Zia ul-Haq and





to the penultimate characteristic of narrative satire: its half-  
tragic quality (in the Aristotelian sense) of having
 
reversal without recognition.  
There are many reversals in Shame, and, as indicated
 
above,  there  is recognition,  
insofar as Omar “recognizes himself” for what he is. Nonetheless,
 
he  is the only  
character to do so. Isky goes down after his own obnoxious fashion; Raza does
 not even realize he has said his last words. Only Omar catches a glimpse of
 who
 
he is and what he has  done — though only immediately before his destruc ­
tion at the hands of his bride. At this point in the argument, Omar’s solitary
 recognition should come as no great surprise: there can be no recognition in
 the political-satiric genre proper, but only through the fairy-tale element of
 Shame. In other
 
words, Shame does not break the “rules” of the political-satir ­




fairy tale projects a particular image of “man” through its hero.  
Max Lüthi suggests:
The fairy tale sees man as one who is essentially isolated, but who, for just
 
this reason — because he is not rigidly committed, not tied down — can
 establish relationships with anything in the world. . . . The fairy tale . . .
 which knows of failure and depicts it in its secondary characters, shows in
 its heroes that
 
despite our  ignorance of ultimate  things,  it  is possible to find  
a secure place in the world. (143)
Lüthi’s characterization of the hero certainly appears able to subsume Omar,
 
the migrant and translated man, under its rubric. Indeed, just as the Narrator
 believes that the epigraph to Shame could be the last fine of Kafka’s The Trial,
Lüthi
 
pinpoints similarities between the fairy tale and the work of Franz  Kafka.  
Specifically, characters are not individuals so much as they are figures, “doers
 and receivers of the action” (145). Again, Omar’s peripheral existence — his
 not being the principal actor in what is supposedly his own story — is perfect
­ly in line with Lüthi’s characterization. For Lüthi, a fundamental difference
 between the fairy tale and the 
works
 of Kafka obtains:
Whereas Kafka’s figures stand helpless and despairing
 
amidst the confusion  
of relationships they do not
 
understand, the fairy-tale hero ... unexpected ­
ly proves to be strong, noble, and blessed. The spirit of the folk fairy tale  
parallels that in modern literature to a degree, but then the listener is
 relieved of his feelings of emptiness and filled with confidence.
Omar never reaches a point in Shame where he is “strong, noble, or blessed.”
 
True, he alone in the novel achieves a certain recognition about
 
what has hap ­
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pened in the story of his life. Nonetheless, his reaction is purely that of resig
­
nation, welcomed as the consummation of a marriage, but no less a resignation
 
because
 of it. He is, to borrow Lüthi’s expression, a negative hero of modern  
literature.
I have claimed from the outset, however, that Omar is not really the ideal
 
solution to the ideological problems posed by the novel, despite his being the
 hero of the fairy-tale
 
portion of Shame. This position is instead occupied by the  
Narrator, who alone remains standing at the apocalyptic conclusion of the
 novel:
And then the explosion comes, a shock-wave that demolishes the house,
 
and after it the fireball of her burning, rolling outwards to the horizon like
 the sea, and
 
last  of all  the cloud, which rises and spreads and hangs over  the  
nothingness of the scene, until I can no longer see what is no longer there; the
 silent cloud, in the shape of a giant, grey and 
headless
 man, a figure of  
dreams, a phantom with one arm lifted in a gesture of farewell. (317;
 emphasis added)




the pseudo-sexual union of Omar and Sufiya. As I have previously  
argued,
 
the combined  terms of the overall  semiotic rectangle, Haroun and Arju-  
mand (see diagram 1), are expressed through “abnormal” sexuality; similarly, the
 ideal term is synthesized quite literally through a “proper” — indeed, long over
­due — “sexual” encounter.
Moreover, the Narrator is also the product, at a formal
 
level, of the attempt  
to synthesize the two 
genres
 operating in Shame. Throughout the vast majori ­
ty of the novel, the Narrator works by mediating between political-satiric and
 fairy-tale genres. Finally, however, it is the Narrator alone who exists at the
 novel
'
s conclusion after Sufiya has spiraled in and swept away the political  
satire, and after Omar and Sufiya have consummated their marriage in a Göt
­terdämmerung, bringing down the walls of Shames fairy-tale world. This
 destruction of genres is precisely an attempt to accomplish formally what the
 novel does in its content: the imposition of solutions through escape, in this
 case, an escape from formal insolubility. These formal antagonisms are repre
­sented in diagram 5 (see below, page 56). Just as the form of political 
satire does not allow for the resolution of ideological tensions — thus forcing Shame
 instead towards the fairy-tale genre for its conclusion — the interplay between
 the political-satiric and the fairy-tale genres does not permit a 
synthesis
 of the  
two in any way and requires an “artificial” resolution to 
show
 the reader “the  
way out.”
To consider how Palmeri’s final characteristic of narrative satire — its progres
­
sive political nature — works in Shame 
requires
 that one follow the same moves  
analytically that Rushdie makes in the 
text:
 one must leave the realm of polit ­
ical satire, consider the world of the fairy tale, and finally end up alone
 
with the  
Narrator. To follow this path, let us consider Lüthi’s analysis of the “image of
 man” in fairy
 
tales, to which I have already  referred: at times it explicitly strays
21
Finn: Failings of Form in Salman Rushdie's Shame
Published by eGrove, 2020
56 Journal x
from a pure formalism — let alone historicism — in order to valorize a neo-
 
Jungian perspective of the 
genre.
 He writes:
It has ... been 
said
 that fairy tales derive from the wishful thinking of poor  
people or those who have been unsuccessful or slighted. But such psycho
­logical and sociological interpretations are too limited. Wish dreams and
 wishful thinking play a part
 
in fairy tales, just as they do in all human mat ­
ters, and social tension and yearnings also are reflected in them. . . . Fairy
­tale figures have an immediate appeal. . . . [Kings, princes, gold, dragons]
 are, for the human imagination, age-old symbols for what is high, noble,
 and pure or dangerous, bestial and unfathomable. . . . [T]hese are images
 for something more fundamental: man
'
s deliverance from an unauthentic  
existence and his commencement of a true one. . .. [T]he fairy tale depicts
 processes of development and maturation. (138-9)
Despite the fact that throughout his work on 
fairy
 tales Lüthi pays attention to  
the sociological and historical specificity of fairy tales, he appears ultimately
 concerned with the universal "human” essence that these 
tales
 all seem to por ­
tray. Yet this retreat is far from unusual: ideologically speaking, the fairy tale
 appears to talk to (and
 
from) an ahistorical, transcultural concept of "man.” The  
fairy tale is (and "always-has-been”) told to children who, unaware of its
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moment of production, nonetheless delight in the hearing. Not surprisingly,
 
there is a powerfully non-ideological appearance to the genre: it is concerned
 with the “human essence,” not with those more particular beliefs or interests of
 transient societies.




is regularly imagined that Shame, being a quintessential "postcolo ­
nial novel,” expresses “the wishful thinking of poor people or those who have
 been
 
unsuccessful  or slighted.” On the contrary, however, Shame is finally about  
and ultimately resolves itself within 
an
 image of man that is supposedly uni ­
versal and transcultural. The Narrator quite explicitly offers the following 
solu­tion to the problems of Pakistan:
[When a dictator falls] it is discovered that he has brought God down with
 
him, that the justifying myth of the nation has been unmade. This leaves
 only two options: disintegration, or a new dictatorship . . . no, there is a
 third, and I shall not be so pessimistic as to deny its possibility. The third
 option is the substitution of
 
a new myth for the old one. Here are three  
such myths, all available from stock at short notice: liberty; equality; fra
­ternity.
I recommend them highly. (278)
The recommendation is presented with sarcasm, suggesting that the solution is
 
really a “no-brainer.” These values should be obvious to all precisely because
 they reaffirm a sense of what it means to be “human.” The novel s detour
 through the genre of the fairy tale is actually a retreat into a form that permits
 one to reaffirm a universal image of man, of “being human.” In other words,
 the Narrator must move through an ideology of liberal humanism in order to
 reach some sort of ideological closure. The novel cannot resolve itself within a
 solution conscious of its own historical specificity, but rather only within a
 
historical ­
ly based ideology imagined as ahistorical. Through 
his
 invocation of the rights of  
man, the Narrator finally validates as universal the “myths” generated by the
 French Revolution, much as he has previously sought parallels to Isky and Raza
 in the antagonism between Danton and Robespierre. It seems, then, that
 Shame departs significantly from Palmeri’s characterization of satire: far from
 being a politically progressive literary text, Shame is ironically a reaffirmation of
 the basic ideological bywords of European colonizing powers.15
5.
I would argue that the foremost task for the Marxist critic today must be the
 
defense of a rigorous standard of literary criticism. In order to understand the
 ways in which historical ideologies appear in literary objects, one 
needs
 to ana ­
lyze the formal structures of those objects. When one works only with the the
­matic elements, one misses textual subtleties that, often enough, are crucial to
 understanding how texts relate to their 
real
 conditions of production. Shame,  
viewed in this light, is far from the revolutionary text that a poststructuralist
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reading technique allows. Instead, Shame seems literally to enact what Terry
 
Eagleton has said about texts in general:
[T]he text presents itself to us less as historical than as a sportive flight
 
from history, a reversal and resistance of history, a momentarily liberated
 zone in which the exigencies of the real seem to evaporate, an enclave of
 freedom enclosed within the realm of necessity. We know that such free
­dom is 
largely
 illusory — that the text is governed; but it is not illusory  
merely in the sense of being a false perception of our own. The text’s illu
­sion of freedom is part
 
of its very nature — an effect of its  peculiarly  overde ­
termined relation to historical reality. (72)
Shame appears to follow this pattern at every turn: the protagonist is "periph
­
eral,” the fairy tale is outside the political satire, the Narrator is outside Pak
­istan, and liberty, equality and fraternity are outside history. Nevertheless, the
 mechanism through which the text finds its "enclave of freedom” is not so
 straightforward. Brennan has argued that Rushdie’s work, in contrast to stan
­dard "postmodernist” texts, contains "too much ‘real history’ . . . juxtaposed
 with a highly personal, subjective and often humorous account of the effect of
 those real historical events on people who, while they are unable to master his
­tory’s flow, make the events meaningful by coming to understand their human
 cost” (141). The qualities of Rushdie’s writing to which Brennan refers are the
 very 
same
 that make Rushdie so appealing aesthetically; conversely, they are  
also the devices through which Shame is able to defuse history within itself.
 "History is what hurts,” Jameson has somewhat famously opined. When all is
 said and done, Shame is a complexly structured attempt to shake off that pain.
 Seemingly avoiding Eagleton’s "sportive flight from history,” Shame confronts
 history, manipulates it, and packs it into terms that the text can handle — or
 more properly, that it thinks it can handle. It first tries to laugh the pain away
 through political satire and then tries to escape through the 
fairy
 tale. After a  
cathartic moment reminiscent of Kafka, the Narrator simply obliterates histo
­ry, and it is here, in the brief moment
 
of its lonely apocalypse,  that the text finds  
its "liberated zone,” outside of history. These formal tensions and antagonisms
 (as well as the text’s attempts to resolve them) are the product of Shames par
­ticularly overdetermined relationship to history. The text forces "ideology into
 contradiction, discloses the limits and absences which mark its relation to his
­tory, and in doing so puts itself into question, producing a lack and disorder
 within itself” (Eagleton 95). If Shame is successful aesthetically and, for many
 critics,
 
politically, it is because it  handles the difficult  contradictions that it pro ­
duces exceptionally well.
Aesthetic merits aside, one can read Shame as "liberatory” only by adopting
 
a reading technique that similarly strives to occlude history. With its hidden
 pessimistic, nihilistic attitude toward struggles against exploitation, poststruc
­turalism (and for that matter Shame) tends to demonize slow, trepeditious, often
 faltering class-based revolutionary movements, while simultaneously glorifying
 any successful discursively counter-hegemonic act as the most politically meri
­torious course of
 
action. It is an attitude easily accommodated by Shame. To  
return briefly to Srivastava’s article on Rushdie, we find:
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The so-called colonial writers [whom Rushdie] writes about are deter
­
mined to subvert the “myth” (in Barthes’ terminology) of literary tradition
 and canon, to revolutionise the language through (among others) metafic-
 tive techniques. What they point to by using the dominant language is
 Barthes’ view that myth-language of an oppressive group is "rich, multi
­form, supple” — it eternalizes the world, by relying on intransitive
 
language  
(149). If myth” is essentially right
 
wing, then writing is revolutionary and  
left wing, and to the consternation of the dominant group of mythmakers,
 extremely committed literature (Barthes 148, 156). To those who are still
 
scept
ical about the value of using writing as a political tool, Catherine  
Belsey cautions that any political struggle has to be verbalized in order to
 escape forever being
 
marginalized (21). Rushdie echoes this  view in Shame,  
(76; emphasis added)16
The purpose of Srivastava’s article is to prove that Rushdie’s working in the
 
“dominant” genre, language and mode of history is highly subversive, and thus,
 in the Foucauldian sense, “liberating.” While it is true that Shame is revolu
­tionary, we should remember that its revolution 
actually
 took place back in  
1789. Shame cannot
 
stand  up to a revolutionary role in the current conjuncture.  
It is deeply entrenched in an anti-revolutionary, bourgeois ideology that Sri
­vastava entirely ignores. Srivastava quotes the passage wherein the Narrator
 suggests liberty, equality and fraternity as solutions, noting only that “Rushdie
 is not blind to the fact of his own role as political propagandist. . . . Rushdie’s
 novels are intensely political” (76-7). Aside from their being somewhat mun
­dane, these observations simply gloss over the political implications of
 Rushdie’s waving the Tricolor 
in
 the one moment where he explicitly offers a  
solution. Neatly elided is an unqualified, unanalyzed revalidation of the dom
­inant “myths” of “Western” society, 
ideals
 that stand in sharp contrast to the  
historical processes of imperialism that produced the ideology of the “two-
 nation theory,” the actual nation-state of Pakistan itself, and eventually the
 events there that would become the explicit and immediate inspiration for
 Shame.
One can argue that Rushdie’s appropriation of a “Western” literary form in
 
a “Western” language is “revolutionized” through the application of “postmod
­ern” literary techniques — for example, metafiction — only by ignoring those
 formal qualities of Shame that are supposedly under analysis. More than any
 Quranic or Gandhian view of history (as Srivastava suggests), Shame comes out
 of
 
a still powerful modernist literary tradition. Its author is a well-educated,  
canonically well-read British cosmopolitan. Shames literary ancestors are
 therefore, not surprisingly, the works of Kafka, Eliot, Joyce, and so forth. If the
 very form of the novel may be considered problematic due to its development
 alongside mercantile and industrial capitalism, can modernism, developing
 alongside the late imperialism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen
­turies, 
be
 viewed any less suspiciously? In other words, following Benjamin’s  
observation that “the bourgeois apparatus of production and publication can
 assimilate astonishing quantities of revolutionary themes . . . [and] can propa
­gate them without calling its own existence, and the existence of the class that
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owns it, seriously into question” (229; cf. Althusser 30), it is important to see
 
the modernist form as a hegemonic apparatus of literary production entirely
 capable of defusing even the most radical of subordinate ideologies. Shames
 content is not particularly revolutionary, and its form serves to reinforce and
 even 
disguise
 the novel’s conservative p sture. Raymond Williams once  
observed that
the avant-garde, in the sense of 
an
 artistic movement which is simultane ­
ously both a cultural and political campaign, 
has
 become notably less com ­
mon. Yet there are avant-garde political positions from the earliest stages
 — dissident from fixed
 
bourgeois forms, but still as bourgeois dissidents —  
which can be seen as a genuine vanguard of
 
a truly modern international  
bourgeoisie which has emerged
 
since 1945. The politics of this New  Right,  
with its versions of libertarianism in a dissolution or deregulation of all the
 bonds and all national and cultural formulations in interest of what is rep
­resented as the ideal open market and the truly open society, look very
 familiar in retrospect. For
 
the  sovereign individual is offered as the dominant  
political and cultural
 
form, even in a world more evidently  controlled by concen ­
trated economic and military power. That it can be offered as such a
 
form, in  such  
conditions, depends partly on that emphasis which was once, within settled
 empires and conservative institutions, so challenging and so marginal. (61-2;
 emphasis added)
It may be a matter of debate as to how “avant-garde” Rushdie actually is, but
 
the point, I believe, still stands: the forms — the genres — in Shame converge
 upon the pinpointed term of the individual, the migrant cosmopolitan writer,
 rising above the apocalyptic contestations of history. In doing so, the novel
 
accom
plishes the formal assimilation of the few counter-hegemonic ideologies  
that it contains into an overall narrative of “postcoloniality.” The Narrator crit
­icizes Omar in a 
revealing
 manner:
Men who deny their pasts become incapable of thinking them real.
 
Absorbed into the great whore-city, having left the frontier universe of Q.
 far behind him once again, Omar Khayyam Shakil’s home-town now seems
 to him like a sort of bad dream, a fantasy, a ghost. The city and the fron
­tier are incompatible worlds; choosing Karachi, Shakil rejects the other. It
 becomes, for him, a feathery insubstantial thing, a discarded skin. He is no
 longer affected by what happens there, 
by
 its logic and demands. He is  
homeless: that is to say, a metropolitan through and through. A city is a
 camp for refugees. (157)
The difference between Omar and the Narrator is, according to the latter, the
 
former’s denial of 
his
 past. If there is one thing that the mere existence of the  
novel is supposed to demonstrate to the reader, it is that the Narrator is cer
­tainly not guilty of this denial. His history is far from insubstantial; 
his
 roots  
— Indian, Pakistani and English — still make claims on him. Nevertheless,
 the condition of migrancy portrayed by the Narrator in Shame facilitates an
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imagined separation from history through the form of the "sovereign individ
­
ual.” In the end, the Narrator seems to stand outside the novel — and, by
 implication, history — peering into it
 
as through a microscope, commenting  on  




Quite clearly, the terms ‘poststructuralist” and “postcolonial” are not  
interchangeable adjectives. Rather, I use the term “postcolonial” to connote
 those theoretical perspectives of world imperialism past and present that have
 been heavily influenced 
by
 — indeed, have risen alongside and out of— post ­
structuralist movements. Insofar as I believe the two to be very much part of
 the same moment and sharing in similar politically problematic perspectives,
 the terms overlap to some extent for 
me.
 Simply put, I situate “postcolonial”  
theory within the realm of poststructuralism.
2.
 
Very  simply described, the rectangle attempts to diagram the competing  
ideologies in the text as well as the results of their 
various
 combinations. The
first step in the process is to identify the two main antagonistic ideologies in the
 
‘text, oftentimes represented by particular characters or 
groups
 of characters.  
These two terms are called contraries and are designated 
by
 the symbols, s1 and  
s2. Next, one identifies the exact opposites of these two contraries, thus logi“
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cally completing the antagonism of s1. and s2. Each of these two new terms is,
 
respectively, in a contradictory relationship with the corresponding 
old
 term and  
is, as such, designated -s1 or -s2. (They are arranged in the rectangle as shown
 below.) After the identification of the competing ideologies and their logical
 contradictions, one begins to combine the terms around the sides of the rec
­tangle. The
 
contraries, s1 and s2, combine to form  the complex term or ideal solu ­
tion, This is straightforward enough: the solution to the problems posed in the
 text is the resolution of the antagonism between the two principal competing
 ideologies. On the other hand, the contraries, -s1 and -s2, combine to form the
 neutral term. Logically, the synthesis of the these two contraries produces a
 term that can never be the solution to the texts dilemma. (It is important to
 note, however, that while the text does not offer it as a solution, the neutral
 term is nevertheless a possibility that the text is capable of imagining but must
 explicitly or implicitly dismiss.) Lastly, the terms produced on the left and
 right sides of the rectangle are simply known as the combined terms. These gen
­erally fill out the rectangle, marking the range of possibilities offered by the
 text. Unlike the neutral term, the combined terms are, to some extent, imag
­ined by the text as viable possibilities. Unlike the ideal solution, however, they
 are not the resolution that the text can finally offer. As with the original four
 terms of the rectangle in its simple form, the combined terms are often repre
­sented by particular characters. (My reading of Greimas is derived from Jame
­son [“Foreword” viii-xvii].)







See, for instance, Daughter of Destiny 287-8 (a conversation on violence  
in struggle between Murtaza and Benazir taking 
place
 after the PIA hijacking)  
and 295-8 (the interaction between Murtaza and Benazir when their brother,
 Shahnawaz, is found dead, likely from poisoning).
5.
 
Throughout this essay, I use masculine pronouns to designate the Nar ­
rator. While the Narrator does indicate that he has recently become a father  
(123), it is the only
 
reference that Shame makes to his gender. The unqualified  
assumption that the Narrator is male would be amiss in a novel in which, as
 Ahmad argues, gender is complexly figured.
6.
 
In an earlier draft of this essay, I included a tedious exposition of the  
fairy-tale portion. Moments in the novel 
were
 linked up with the appropriate  
fairy-tal  element, as described by Propp. The conclusions that this section of
 my essay reaches 
were
 made based upon that exposition.
7.
 
Obviously, I do not mean to suggest that the generic divisions in Shame  
are rigidly distinct and that lines of demarcation may easily be drawn through
­out the text to indicate their respective territories. Characters,
 
plot  devices, set ­
tings and so forth all overlap, and thus the genres do as well. Instead, we might
 say that at any given moment in the novel one generic form or the other is
 largely dominant and, anticipating a later argument in this essay, that the two
 forms work
 
with, against, and off one another. Indeed, from an aesthetic per ­
spective, it is precisely this interplay that 
makes
 Shame interesting; but, from a  
political perspective, as
 
I hope  to  prove,  it is also what makes Shame finally reac ­
tionary.
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8.
 
On the two occasions in which the function of the villain is fulfilled by  
a character other than Raza Hyder, it
 
is performed by the guerrillas in Q. It is  
not Raza who deceives Babar but rather an earthquake, drink and, more impor
­
tant
ly, the guerrillas involved in the armed struggle in Q. Considering  
Rushdie
'
s attitude towards militancy, it is not insignificant that these guerrilla  
groups should be the sole substitute for Raza in the role of villain.
9.
 
In later years, after the writing of Shame, Zia was portrayed less harsh ­
ly in the wake of Thatcher's and Reagan
'
s support for his government.
10.
 
This is, of course, not a particularly outrageous claim. It is, more or  
less, simply a matter of Rushdies siding with the 
lesser
 of two evils. For exam ­
ple, while Rushdi  has always had grave problems with the PPP and Bhutto
 (both Benazir and her father), he still prefers them to
 
the  regime  of General Zia  
ul Haq. See Rushdie, “Zia” and “Daughter.”
11.
 
Brennans essay on Shame lists a number of Peccavistan-Pakistan cor ­
respondences (as well as a
 
few words on the significance of names in the novel).  
Part 
2
 of the present study details a number of others. One peculiar corre ­
spondence occurs when Rani Harappa sees Isky’s corpse. Claiming that Isky
 could not have been hanged, because there is no mark from the rope left on his
 neck, she deduces that his killers must have hanged him after he was already
 dead (Shame 205). Shortly after Z. A. Bhutto
'
s death, this same rumor was cir ­
culated. Bhutto
'
s first wife (not  Begum Nusrat Bhutto, who  was not allowed to  
see the corpse) claimed that the former prime minister
'
s corpse “showed none  
of the normal signs of hanging,” and the family
 
suggested that  he had  been tor ­
tured to death in an effort to extract a confession (“Bhutto Murdered” 5). See
 also “Bhutto
'
s Widow” 20, and Schofield 241. It is interesting to note that the  
difference between Bhutto and Isky is that while the former was rumored to
 have been tortured to death, the latter brought on his sudden death 
in Rushdie
'
s novel by insulting  Talvar Ulhaq (262).
12.
 
As Zia allegedly said to Benazir Bhutto, “Our families have known  





Suleri argues this point,  viewing the political milieu of Shame as a con ­
flict between westernization and fundamentalism (182).
14.
 
It  is important to note here that, following  Propp’s scheme of the form,  
fairy 
tales
 always involve characters leaving their home or community, in order  
to return at some later point. “Migrancy,” quite literally, is a formal character
­istic of the fairy tale genre and we find it present in Shame, not just in Omar
'
s 
journey but also in the Beast
'
s escape from Sufiya, from the attic and from the  
bounds of behavior considered acceptable to the community.
15.
 
It is not that “liberty, equality and fraternity” are inherently undesirable  
but rather that they are extremely loaded terms, carrying 
an
 historical burden  
of meaning from which they
 
cannot be disentangled. Their invocation is prob ­
lematic insofar as it is a reteat away from history (and a progressive analysis of
 it) towards “myths” that present themselves as given and ahistorical. Rushdie
 is not necessarily wrong to suggest “liberty, equality and fraternity” as solutions,
 but what one finds missing in Shame is 
any
 sense of how these ideals are to be  
truly realized, a lack ultimately owing to the limits of
 
Rushdie’s political and 
ideological horizon: liberal humanism.
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Srivastava’s reading of Barthes is not entirely correct. Barthes does not  
make the blanket claim that all writing is necessarily revolutionary. He writes
 instead: “I have been asked whether there are myths on the Left.’ Of course,
 inasmuch, precisely, as the Left is not revolution. Left-wing myth 
supervenes precisely at the moment
 
when revolution changes itself into ‘the Left,’ that is,  
when it accepts to wear a mask, to hide its name, to generate an innocent meta
­language and to distort itself into ‘Nature’” (146-7). Insofar as Rushdie’s sug
­gested myths of liberty, equality and fraternity are “all available from stock,”
 surely Barthes argues against Srivastava’s point by noting: “Left-wing myth is
 always an artificial myth, a reconstituted myth: hence its clumsiness” (148).
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